GAMESCORE
Signaling
Costly actions reveal hidden quality when only the strong can afford them.
How it works
- Senders know their type; receivers only see actions.
- A signal works when it costs weak types more than strong types.
- Separating equilibria sort types; pooling equilibria hide them.
Use → Credentials, warranties, pricing, hiring. Ask what makes a signal too costly to fake.
Watch out → Signal inflation — once everyone can afford it, it stops separating anyone.
Try it → List three signals your customers rely on and what each would cost a weak rival to fake.
REDCAPE jobs → Explain · Design · Communicate
Free sources → SFI Game Theory II • Wikipedia: Signalling (economics) (CC BY-SA)
Attach to a lattice — combines with
Different families, shared jobs. Disagreement between them is where insight lives.
DECISIONS
Decision Trees + Value of Information
Fold back probabilities; pay for information only if it changes the action.
SHARED JOBS: DESIGN · COMMUNICATE
LEARNINGDiversity Prediction Theorem
Crowd error equals average error minus diversity. Diverse models beat the lone genius.
SHARED JOBS: DESIGN · COMMUNICATE
DISTRIBUTIONSEntropy & Uncertainty
Entropy scores surprise: equilibrium, cyclic, random and complex outcomes sit at different levels of uncertainty.
SHARED JOBS: EXPLAIN · COMMUNICATE
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